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An influential theory has it that metaphysical indeterminacy occurs
just when reality can be made completely precise in multiple ways.
That characterization is formulated by employing the modal appara-
tus of ersatz possible worlds. As quantum physics taught us, reality
cannot be made completely precise. I meet the challenge by provid-
ing an alternative theory which preserves the use of ersatz worlds but
rejects the precisificational view of metaphysical indeterminacy. The
upshot of the proposed theory is that it is metaphysically indetermi-
nate whether p just in case it is neither true nor false that p, and no
terms in ‘p’ are semantically defective. In other words, metaphysical
indeterminacy arises when the world cannot be adequately described
by a complete set of sentences defined in a semantically nondefective
language. Moreover, the present theory provides a reductive analysis of
metaphysical indeterminacy, unlike its influential predecessor. Finally,
I argue that any adequate logic of a language with an indeterminate
subject matter is neither compositional nor bivalent.
1 Precisificational possibilities
The idea that indeterminacy may be not only semantic (originating in
language1), but also metaphysical (originating in the nonrepresentational
1The dominant theory of semantic indeterminacy is the supervaluationism of Fine [16].
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world), has been a fringe view until not long ago, mostly due to a combi-
nation of two factors: an influential argument of Evans [15] against vague
objects,2 as well as a lack of theories that could capture metaphysical inde-
terminacy in a clear and rigorous fashion. The tide turned with a number of
recent papers which have brought the notion of metaphysical indeterminacy
out of disrepute. I will focus on the most discussed proposal, developed by
Elizabeth Barnes and Robert Williams (henceforth, BW).3
The BW account models metaphysical indeterminacy in terms of precisi-
fications: roughly, the world is indeterminate just in case there are multiple
ways it can be made precise. The idea is spelled out by way of the standard
distinction between a world, a concrete object made up of things and prop-
erties, and an ersatz world, an abstract representation of a world. For our
present purpose, we can assume linguistic ersatzism, the view that what does
the representing are maximally consistent sets of sentences defined in a se-
mantically nondefective world-making language—although nothing essential
hinges on the linguistic construal of ersatz worlds. That the world-making
language is semantically nondefective means that none of its terms are either
vacuous or semantically vague. (The assumption of semantic nondefective-
ness is crucial in distinguishing metaphysical indeterminacy from other kinds
of indeterminacy, as will be discussed in section 2.) BW assume that the er-
satz worlds are maximally consistent with respect to a background classical
logic.4
2The target of Evans’ argument is indeterminate identity. While his result does not
per se rule out the possibility of metaphysical indeterminacy sans indeterminate identity,
as a matter of fact it had the effect of putting metaphysical indeterminacy in a bad light
overall.
3The most developed version of the account is Barnes and Williams [7]; see also Barnes
[5], Williams [25] [26]. The version of BW’s account which I employ in the present dis-
cussion is based on Williams [26]. Alternative accounts of metaphysical indeterminacy
include Akiba [1] [2], Wilson [27]; see Bokulich [10] for a discussion of quantum metaphys-
ical indeterminacy.
4Barnes and Williams [7, p. 114]. The classical discussion of ersatzism, linguistic and
otherwise, is Lewis [17, pp. 136–91].
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Following BW, an ersatz world E is said to be a precisificational possi-
bility for a world w if E does not determinately misrepresent w—formally,
∀p(p ∈ E → ‘p’ is not determinately false at w). A world w is said to be
metaphysically indeterminate if it has multiple precisificational possibilities.5
Notice that BW’s proposal does not amount to an analysis of metaphysical
indeterminacy, since the definiens employs the notion of determinacy. The
resulting theory is therefore unlike standard supervaluationism, which an-
alyzes semantic indeterminacy in terms of quantification over (admissible)
precisifications.
An ersatz world is said to be a precisificational actuality if it is a precisi-
ficational possibility for the actual world. So, our world is metaphysically
indeterminate just in case there are multiple precisificational actualities. For
instance, consider the classical problem of material constitution involving a
statue (Goliath) and a lump of clay (Lumpl). Some regard them as one ob-
ject having this or that modal property relative to a mode of presentation,
or to a standard of similarity by which counterparts are picked out. An
alternative view has it that the statue and the lump of clay are distinct but
spatiotemporally coincident objects. Both views are currently regarded as
live theoretical possibilities, and both are presumably consistent with the
empirical data. I submit that the controversy could be defused by diag-
nosing it as an instance of metaphysical indeterminacy, to wit as a case in
which things are such that it is indeterminate whether the statue and the
lump of clay are identical. The BW theory allows us to make that intuition
precise: metaphysical indeterminacy about the identity of Lumpl and Go-
liath amounts to the existence of (at least) two precisificational actualities,
one containing the sentence ‘Lumpl is Goliath’, one containing the sentence
‘Lumpl is not Goliath’.
5Akiba [3] argued that BW’s notion of metaphysical indeterminacy is a consequence of
uncontroversial facts about indeterminacy, and therefore that there is nothing specifically
metaphysical about it. I will come back to this issue in section 2.
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Skow [23] has argued that there are instances of deep metaphysical inde-
terminacy which cannot be adequately modeled in terms of the BW account,
due to the fact that reality cannot be made completely precise (cf. Darby
[13]). Examples of deep metaphysical indeterminacy can be cooked up by
appealing to quantum mechanics. According to Heisenberg’s uncertainty
principle, there are pairs of quantum mechanical properties (observables)
which are incompatible, in the sense that they cannot both have determi-
nate values for a given particle at the same time. For instance, an electron
cannot have both determinate position and determinate momentum at any
given time—the more precise the position, the less precise the momentum,
and vice versa. Now, suppose that electron e has position values xi∈I and
momentum values pj∈J , where I, J are uncountable sets of indices. Let
φ(e, xi) stand for ‘e has position xi’, and χ(e, pj) stand for ‘e has momen-
tum pj ’. If, at some time t, it is true that χ(e, pj), for some j ∈ J , it follows
by the uncertainty principle that φ(e, xi) is untrue, for all i ∈ I. On the
hypothesis that quantum indeterminacy is metaphysical in character,6 BW
tell us that there are uncountably many precisificational actualities Ei∈I
such that {χ(e, pj), φ(e, xi)} ⊆ Ei, for all i ∈ I. But we know from the
uncertainty principle that position and momentum cannot both be sharp;
therefore there are no such possible ersatz worlds as Ei, against the BW
account. It must be concluded that the BW account is unable to model
quantum metaphysical indeterminacy.
Before I turn to discussing the objection from deep metaphysical indeter-
minacy, one caveat is in order. When I speak of quantum indeterminacy, I
do not mean that it may be indeterminate which state of a quantum system
is actualized. That is, of course, determinate: the actual state is the one
picked out by the system’s wave function. What I mean, instead, is that a
particle may fail to have a determinate (or definite, or sharp) value of some
quantum property. In other words, quantum indeterminacy is property in-
6The thesis that quantum mechanics provides examples of metaphysical indeterminacy
has been articulated in Bokulich [10], Lowe [18] [19], Williams [25], Wilson [27].
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determinacy, rather than state indeterminacy. The key issue of this paper is
to determine whether property indeterminacy at the quantum level can be
subsumed by a general theory of metaphysical indeterminacy in the vicinity
of BW.
Two reactions to Skow’s argument come immediately to mind. First of
all, one might think that the quantum formalism is incomplete, and that
the uncertainty principle expresses a merely epistemic constraint. If so,
fundamental physics need not be a source of metaphysical indeterminacy,
thus leaving the BW account unscathed. In such a scenario, it would be up to
the physicists to formulate a hidden variable theory, i.e., a framework which
matches the predictive power of standard quantum theory, and explains
away the uncertainty in epistemic terms.7
Now, the orthodox (Copenhagen) interpretation of quantum mechanics
regards the formalism as complete, thus ruling out the possibility of hidden
variables. But what if the orthodox interpretation turns out to be incor-
rect? Skow [23, p. 856] points out that the orthodox interpretation is at
least possibly true, which suffices to show the inadequacy of the BW ac-
count, since the latter aims to model metaphysical indeterminacy at every
possible world. One might rejoin that, when the orthodox interpretation
(or any interpretation of quantum mechanics, for that matter) is said to be
possible, the relevant notion of possibility is epistemic. For when we say of
some theory that it might be true, what is meant is that, for all we know,
the actual world is the way that theory prescribes. But a thesis which is
epistemically possible need not be true at some world, as we know from
7There exist results—most notably Bell’s theorem and the Kochen-Specker theorem—
that impose strict constraints on any empirically adequate hidden variable theory. It is a
consequence of the Kochen-Specker theorem that there is no hidden variable formulation
of quantum mechanics, as long as the value of an observable is independent of how that
value is measured. Bell’s theorem states that any hidden variable theory must be non-
local, allowing some sort of action at a distance.
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the existence of metaphysically impossible propositions which used to be
epistemic possibilities—e.g., that Hesperus is not Phosphorus. Be that as it
may, I will set this objection aside and concede to Skow that the orthodox
interpretation is a bona fide metaphysical possibility.
The second reaction is that the objection from deep metaphysical in-
determinacy hinges on the requirement that every Ei is a possible ersatz
world. If we generalize the BW account by allowing impossible ersatz worlds
(contradictory sets of sentences closed under some paraconsistent logic), we
could capture the indeterminacy of e’s position, as desired. I think there
are two problems with that proposal. One is methodological. Sure, it has
been argued that impossibilia play a significant role in metaphysical theoriz-
ing, especially in modeling fine-grained properties and propositions, making
sense of counterpossible reasoning, as well as providing a modal characteri-
zation of essence (Berto [8], Broogard and Salerno [11], Correia [12], Nolan
[20], Vander Laan [24], Yagisawa [29]). Nevertheless, ontological parsimony
and theoretical conservativity advise caution: the addition of impossibilia
is only justified if strictly required, ceteris paribus. As I will argue in the
next section, we can model quantum metaphysical indeterminacy without
bothering with impossible ersatz worlds.
One may rejoin that every Ei is physically impossible but metaphysically
possible, and therefore that we can accept it in our ontology without the
slightest form of revisionism. The move, however, is fallacious. Since precisi-
ficational actualities are complete descriptions, they must contain a sentence
stating Heisenberg’s uncertaintity principle, which is logically inconsistent
with each {χ(e, pj), φ(e, xi)}. Thus, no Ei is metaphysically possible.
A further reason for being skeptical about the impossible-world strategy
is the following. Consider the aforementioned interpretation of the puzzle
of material constitution in terms of metaphysically indeterminate identity.
If the precisificational actualities are all of the ersatz worlds, possible or
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impossible, which do not determinately misrepresent how things are, one of
such ersatz worlds will have to be an impossible one containing both ‘Lumpl
is Goliath’ and ‘Lumpl is not Goliath’. Consequently, there is a way to
make actuality precise in which a contradiction is true, which means that
the actual world is not determinately possible. But such a conclusion is
overly revisionary, insofar as every theory of modality (perhaps with the
sole exception of dialetheism) regards the actual world as determinately
possible. As long as we want a theory of metaphysical indeterminacy which
is compatible with the standard view of actuality as an instance of possibility,
the impossible-world approach ought to be deemed inadequate.
2 Incomplete ersatz worlds
In the previous section I introduced the BW account of metaphysical in-
determinacy, and explained why that account is unable to capture quan-
tum metaphysical indeterminacy. The gist of the objection is that not all
metaphysical indeterminacy can be understood in terms of ways the world
can be made completely precise. Skow [23, p. 858] concludes that “How
to model deep metaphysical indeterminacy remains an open question.” In
the present section I will sketch an alternative framework which does away
with the precisificational approach, while preserving the machinery of ersatz
possible worlds. The upshot will be a view according to which metaphysi-
cal indeterminacy arises just when some sentence, defined in a semantically
nondefective language, is neither true nor false.
One moral that can be drawn from the discussion of the previous section
is that we should reject the received view that logical space is defined by the
maximally consistent sets of sentences. In order to see why, let us go back to
our electron e. We saw that a precisificational possibility Ek for that world
cannot contain any φ(e, xi), if it contains some χ(e, pj). Since BW’s theory
assumes that ersatz worlds are maximal, each Ek will then have to contain
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every negation ¬φ(e, xi), which leads to trouble. Recall that our goal is
to model the fact that, when momentum is sharp, every atomic position
statement is untrue, that is:
(i) e does not have a determinate position.
However, if every ¬φ(e, xi) is in each Ek, then all atomic position statements
are false, and so:
(ii) e does not have a position.
For the statement that e has a position is regimented in terms of a sentence
of the form ∃zφ(e, z). Assuming that xi∈I are all the position values, the
statement is logically equivalent with
∨
i∈I φ(e, xi), which is the infinitary
disjunction of the sentences expressing the possible determinate positions of
e. If each disjunct φ(e, xi) is false,
∨
i∈I φ(e, xi) is false too (by De Morgan’s
Laws), and so is ∃zφ(e, z).8
Incidentally, notice that if we do embrace (ii), a response to Skow’s ob-
jection is available on behalf of BW. For the argument from deep metaphys-
ical indeterminacy first assumes that quantum indeterminacy is a particular
case of metaphysical indeterminacy; then shows that quantum indetermi-
nacy cannot be modeled via BW’s theory; and finally concludes that not all
metaphysical indeterminacy can be modeled via BW’s theory. Of course,
if (ii) was the case, quantum indeterminacy would not be an instance of
metaphysical indeterminacy (since any statement about position, or what
have you, would be determinately true or determinately false), thus making
Skow’s argument unsound.
As it turns out, there are empirical reasons for believing that superpo-
sition of position states entails indeterminate position (as per (i)), rather
than lack of position (as per (ii)). The crucial fact is that particles can be
at a determinate distance from each other, even when their positions are
indeterminate. That would be impossible, if superposition of position states
8A classical reference on infinitary logic is Dickmann [14].
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amounted to a lack of position—provided that being at a determinate dis-
tance from something presupposes having a position. Therefore, it is correct
to say that a particle can have indeterminate position, but not that it can
have no position.
Let’s unpack the argument. As a preliminary remark, it is noteworthy
that a particle in a superposition of position states can have a determinate
distance from another particle:
Suppose an electron and a proton become entangled in the po-
sition degree of freedom. It may be possible to ascribe to the
two-particle system a definite difference of positions (xA − xB),
without being able to ascribe a definite position to either parti-
cle individually. For example, the particles might determinately
be ten meters apart, even though neither particle by itself has a
definite position. (Bokulich [10, p. 469–70])
But only something with a position can be at a determinate distance from
something else. As a consequence, particles with indeterminate position can
have a position, contra (ii).
The above line of thought can be distilled into the following argument:
1. Physical distance is a relation between positions in physical space (or
spacetime).
2. Distance between physical objects is physical distance between their
positions.
3. Therefore, physical objects which are at some distance from each other
are objects which have a position in space (or spacetime).
4. Particles with indeterminate position can be at some distance from
each other.
5. Therefore, particles with indeterminate position can have a position
in space (or spacetime).
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I regard premises (1) and (2) as definitionally true; premise (4) is an em-
pirical fact, as remarked; and the inference is valid. Therefore, thesis (ii) is
false.
Let’s take stock. We have just seen that there are empirically informed
reasons for rejecting (ii). But (ii) is a consequence of the assumption that
ersatz worlds are maximal. Therefore, we should embrace the revisionary
view that regards ersatz worlds as consistent, but possibly incomplete sets
of sentences in a world-making language.9
My goal, for the remainder of this section, is to show that metaphysical
indeterminacy can be successfully captured by means of incomplete ersatz
worlds. The solution, I submit, is to abandon the notion of a precisificational
possibility altogether and define the theory as follows. An ersatz world E is
said to be an adequate possibility for a world w if E represents w—formally,
∀p(p ∈ E ↔ ‘p’ is true at w). A world w is said to be metaphysically
indeterminate if it has an incomplete adequate possibility. An ersatz world
is said to be an adequate actuality if it is an adequate possibility for the
actual world. So, our world is metaphysically indeterminate just in case
there is an incomplete adequate actuality.
The resulting picture is rather straightforward: a world is metaphysi-
cally determinate when it is adequately represented by a maximally consis-
tent ersatz world; it is indeterminate otherwise, which is to say, when it is
adequately represented by some gappy ersatz world.
The intuition underlying the present proposal is quite natural. BW and
I agree on one thing: for reality to be determinate is to be described by a
unique and complete ersatz world. According to BW, what fails in cases of
indeterminacy is the uniqueness condition. The BW characterization, how-
ever, is undermined by cases of deep metaphysical indeterminacy. On the
present proposal, it is the completeness condition that fails in cases of in-
9Cf. Putnam [22, p. 185]: “A system has no complete description in quantum mechan-
ics; such a thing is a logical impossibility.”.
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determinacy. In other words, reality is metaphysically indeterminate when
some sentence formulated in a semantically nondefective language is neither
true nor false. As I will soon argue, the present characterization avoids the
issue of deep metaphysical indeterminacy.
A few remarks are in order. First of all, since ersatz worlds can be incom-
plete, the definition of an adequate possibility has to involve a biconditional—
unlike BW’s definition of a precisificational possibility. For if we had defined
an adequate possibility by means of the clause ‘∀p(p ∈ E →‘p’ is true at w)’,
it would follow that the empty set is an adequate possibility for any world,
and therefore that metaphysical indeterminacy is trivially necessary.
Secondly, every world has exactly one adequate possibility. For suppose
that some world w is represented by distinct E,E′. By extensionality, there
would have to be some sentence p which is in E but not E′ (or vice versa),
and therefore p would be both true and untrue at w, a contradiction.
Thirdly, and most importantly, the present proposal yields a reductive
analysis of the notion of metaphysical indeterminacy—unlike BW’s account.
Indeed, whereas the notion of determinacy is employed in the definition of
a precisificational possibility (see previous section), it is not employed in
the definition of an adequate possibility. In particular, the present proposal
reduces metaphysical indeterminacy to representational incompleteness in a
semantically nondefective language.
Back to the objection from deep metaphysical indeterminacy, it is easy
to see that the problem is quickly taken care of. To say that electron e has
determinate momentum and indeterminate position is tantamount to saying
that the one adequate actuality contains χ(e, pj), for some j ∈ J , but nei-
ther φ(e, xi) nor its negation, for some i ∈ I. This fact is not only consistent
with Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle—it also meets the desideratum that
our metaphysics be inspired by the current best science. For if quantum
theory (according to the orthodox interpretation) tells us that determinacy
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of all observables is impossible, it is methodologically wise to rule out the
existence of (possible) ersatz worlds where quantum theory is true and some
complementary observables, such as position and momentum, are both de-
fined for the same particle at the same time.
The present proposal seems to face an objection from expressive incom-
pleteness. Let w be a quantum-mechanical world containing only one parti-
cle: an electron e, which has neither determinate position nor determinate
momentum. (The quantum formalism doesn’t allow complementary observ-
ables to be both sharp, but it allows them to be both unsharp.) Since the
adequate possibility E for w won’t contain χ(e, pj), φ(e, xi) or their nega-
tions, E must be the empty ersatz world.10 But then there are multiple
possible states of e, in fact infinitely many, which are represented by the
empty ersatz world—some of them are states of e in which the position is
sharper and the momentum is less sharp, whereas others are states of e in
which the momentum is sharper and the position is less sharp. As a con-
sequence, there is a one-many correspondence between ersatz worlds and
possibilities. Logical space is incomplete, and badly so.
The objection fails because it unduly assumes that position and mo-
mentum are the only observables expressible in the world-making language.
Sure, if the world-making language were to be that impoverished, it should
be no wonder that logical space turns out to be incomplete. But it is a
fact about quantum mechanics that every state of a system is sharp with
respect to some observable. (Formally: every vector in a Hilbert space is an
eigenvector of some Hermitian operator.11) We may assume that to every
10I am here ignoring the fact that E must include general information about w, such
as the quantum-mechanical laws, as well as particular information about the intrinsic
properties of e, and some necessary truths.
11“Any Hermitian operator on a given space will invariably be associated with some
measurable property of the physical system connected with that space... Any vector
whatever in a given space will invariably be an eigenvector of some complete Hermitian
operator on that space. That... will entail that any quantum state whatever of a given
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quantum observable there corresponds a predicate in the world-making lan-
guage. As a consequence, the state of our electron e in w will be expressed
by some sentence ‘s’=‘e has property P with value x’; and so the adequate
possibility E for w will have ‘s’ as a member. The moral is that, provided
that the world-making language is sufficiently rich, to every state of every
(quantum) world there will correspond a sentence which appears as a mem-
ber of the relevant adequate possibility, in such a way that to different states
there correspond different adequate possibilities. The present proposal has
not been shown to suffer from expressive incompleteness.12
A second objection is that the present view overgenerates instances of
metaphysical indeterminacy. Akiba [3] has argued that the BW account
collapses metaphysical indeterminacy with indeterminacy simpliciter. For,
goes the objection, on the BW account metaphysical indeterminacy arises
iff the world has multiple precisificational possibilities; which is the case iff
physical system will invariably be associated with some definite value of some measurable
property of that system.” Albert [4, p. 41].
12One may rejoin that my reply conflates Hermitian operators with properties. For,
goes the objection, the fact that every quantum property is captured by some Hermitian
operator by no means entails that every Hermitian operator captures some quantum prop-
erty. Consequently, I have failed to show that every state of a system is sharp with respect
to some property. (I owe this observation to an anonymous referee.) The objection can
be dealt with by appealing to the standard distinction between an abundant and a sparse
conception of properties. When the objector raises doubts about the claim that every
Hermitian operator captures some quantum property, what she has in mind is arguably
the sparse conception of a physical property, or observable. The idea is that, even though
one can define infinitely many Hermitian operators in a Hilbert space, it is highly doubtful
that to each there corresponds some genuine physical property. But of course I do not
need to endorse such a preposterous view. The notion of property, or observable, that I
presuppose in my reply to the objection from expressive incompleteness is the abundant
one, according to which a property is the semantic value of a condition definable in the
relevant language. In the present case the language is the language of quantum mechan-
ics, and the semantic values of the conditions definable in that language are Hermitian
operators. Therefore, there is no risk of running out of properties in the relevant sense.
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some sentence p is such that neither p is false nor ¬p is false; which is the case
iff some sentence p is neither true nor false; which is the case iff it is inde-
terminate whether p, for some p. It follows that the BW theory is unable to
characterize metaphysical indeterminacy as a peculiar phenomenon differing
from semantic indeterminacy (or any kind of indeterminacy originating in
the representational world).
Akiba’s objection in fact carries over to all accounts of metaphysical
indeterminacy based on ersatz worlds. As for my own account, the argument
would go thus: on the present view metaphysical indeterminacy arises iff the
adequate ersatz world is incomplete; which is the case iff there is some p such
that neither p nor ¬p belongs to the adequate ersatz world; which is the case
iff some p is neither true nor false; which is the case iff it is indeterminate
whether p, for some p.
However, recall a key assumption built into the way the BW account was
introduced in section 1: the world-making language is semantically nonde-
fective. Even though Barnes and Williams do not specify that condition
in so many words, it is quite clear that they take their ersatz worlds (or
whatever representational devices play the relevant role) to be precise, and
that is the way the BW is typically understood in the literature.13 Precisely
because of that feature, on the BW account the world has multiple precisi-
ficational possibilities iff some sentence p is such that neither p is false nor
¬p is false and the language of p is semantically nondefective; which is the
case iff it is indeterminate whether p, for some p, and the language of p is
semantically nondefective. As a consequence, Akiba’s purported rebuttal of
the BW account misfires.
Since I am also assuming that the world-making language is semantically
nondefective, Akiba’s argument cannot be successfully deployed against my
own view, and for the very same reason. Indeed, on the present proposal
13Cf. Skow [23, p. 858], who considers and rejects a modification of the BW account in
which the ersatz worlds are defined in “a language which suffers from semantic indetermi-
nacy”.
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the adequate ersatz world is incomplete iff there is some p such that neither
p nor ¬p belongs to the actual ersatz world and the language of p is seman-
tically nondefective; which is the case iff it is indeterminate whether p, for
some p, and the language of p is semantically nondefective. It can be con-
cluded that the present view does not collapse metaphysical indeterminacy
with indeterminacy simpliciter.
Can we conclude that the present view does not overgenerate instances
of metaphysical indeterminacy? Not quite. There are two special cases that
need to be taken care of. First of all, one might point to some p which is
semantically indeterminate, even though the language of p is semantically
nondefective. A paradigmatic case is reference failure, as in ‘the present
king of France is a king’. Here, one might argue, we have a definite de-
scription built out of semantically nondefective terms: the descriptor ‘the’,
and the complex predicate ‘present king of France’. Nevertheless, the re-
sulting description ‘the present king of France’ is empty, and so the whole
sentence is truth-valueless. Therefore, my theory falsely entails that it is
metaphysically indeterminate whether the present king of France is a king.
(To avoid noise, I assume that all nonlogical constants in the sentence are
semantically precise.) But of course, if the sentence is indeterminate, the in-
determinacy does not originate in the nonrepresentational world, but rather
in the semantics of ‘the present king of France’.
I reply by denying that ‘the present king of France is a king’ is truth-
valueless. There are known ways of articulating this view, which is essen-
tially Russellian, so I will not rehearse them here. Nevertheless, I concede
that the objection can be blocked only by taking a stance on the debate
about the logical form of definite descriptions.
There is a second class of cases in which my theory may overgenerate.
Consider the sentence ‘Hesperus is a planet’. One might argue that the
sentence is truth-valueless at any world w where Hesperus does not exist.
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But the language in which the sentence is formulated is semantically nonde-
fective. Therefore, my theory falsely entails that, at w, it is metaphysically
indeterminate whether Hesperus is a planet. (Again, I assume that all non-
logical constants in the sentence are semantically precise.) But of course
there is nothing about the nonrepresentational world w which makes the
sentence indeterminate. The reason of the indeterminacy is purely seman-
tic, namely the fact that ‘Hesperus’ fails to refer at w.
I reply by denying that ‘Hesperus is a planet’ is truth-valueless at any
world where Hesperus does not exist. There are routine ways of articulating
the semantics so as to meet that constraint, namely by adopting a positive
or negative semantics for free logic, so I will not rehearse them here.14 Nev-
ertheless, I concede that, in order to block the objection, I need to take a
stance on the debate about the semantics of possibly nonreferring individual
constants.
3 Compositionality
Having settled the problem of characterizing metaphysical indeterminacy, it
remains to establish the logic of a language with an indeterminate subject
matter, i.e., one able to express instances of metaphysical indeterminacy.
Even though the task of providing an answer to that question lies beyond
the scope of the present work, I am going to make a few remarks which
will hopefully pave the way for identifying the correct logic. In particular, I
am going to argue that the logic of metaphysical indeterminacy is noncom-
positional. I will restrict the scope of the discussion to basic propositional
languages—although a fully satisfactory account should cover at least first-
order languages with operators for modality and determinacy (a task carried
out in Barnes and Williams [7]).
I assume a modal account of logical validity for a basic propositional
language: p is said to be valid if it is true at all worlds. As a consequence, p is
14On the topic of free logics and their semantics, see Nolt [21].
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valid iff it is a member of every ersatz world. First of all notice that, insofar
as there are cases of metaphysical indeterminacy, actual or possible, and
metaphysical indeterminacy is tantamount to truth-valuelesness of sentences
of a certain kind, then the logic of a language with an indeterminate subject
matter is not bivalent.
Moreover, in the previous section empirically informed reasons were pro-
vided in support of the view that the disjunction
∨
i∈I φ(e, xi) of the sen-
tences expressing all possible position states of a particle e can be true, even
when no disjunct is true. (The reason, once again, is that the disjunction
is equivalent with the sentence ‘e has a position’ (i.e., ∃zφ(e, z)), which can
be true even when none of its instances is.) That fact entails the following
logical thesis: the disjunction of the propositions expressing all possible val-
ues of a given quantum observable for a particle at a time can be true, even
when no disjunct is true.15
Now, let e be in a superposition of position states. It follows that no
φ(e, xi) is true. We also know that, when e is in a superposition of position
states, it is possible that ‘e has a position’ is true and so, by De Morgan’s
Laws, that some φ(e, xi) is not false. Some φ(e, xi) must therefore be inde-
terminate. Let’s suppose that every φ(e, xi) is indeterminate—to be sure,
a physically possible scenario, namely one in which e is not in an eigen-
state of position, and the probability of e to have any determinate position
upon measurement is nonzero. Whatever logic turns out to be correct for
a language with an indeterminate subject matter, it is to be expected that
disjunction be idempotent, i.e., any sentence p is equivalent with a (possibly
infinitary) disjunction p ∨ p ∨ . . . It follows that the sentence obtained from∨
i∈I φ(e, xi) by replacing each disjunct φ(e, xi) with the materially equiva-
lent φ(e, x1) is going to be indeterminate. On the other hand,
∨
i∈I φ(e, xi)
15Incidentally, that thesis is validated by the quantum logic of Birkhoff and von Neu-
mann [9], where the behavior of sentential connectives is read off of the structure of Hilbert
spaces. It is worth remarking, however, that my argument from the previous section con-
cerning the truth value of
∨
i∈I φ(e, xi) is independent of the acceptance of quantum logic.
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is by hypothesis true. It must be concluded that a logic of metaphysical
indeterminacy which accounts for quantum phenomena is going to be non-
compositional, since it does not permit substitution of materially equivalent
sentences salva veritate.16
Albert [4, p. 38] has defended the view that when a particle is in a
superposition of states relative to an observable, the predicate expressing
that observable simply does not apply:
The right way to think about superpositions of, say, being black
and being white is to think of them as situations wherein color
predicates cannot be applied, situations wherein color talk is un-
intelligible. Talking and inquiring about the color of an electron
in such circumstances is (on this view) like talking or inquiring
about, say, whether or not the number 5 is still a bachelor. [. . . ]
And that’s the way things are, on this view, for all sorts of super-
position: superpositions are situations wherein the superposed
predicates just don’t apply.
Is Albert’s observation correct? Yes and no. Sure, every φ(e, xi) is truth-
valueless whenever a particle is in a superposition of all positions states;
and the ersatz world which adequately represents that superposition will
not have any φ(e, xi) or its negation as members. Nevertheless, in virtue of
the noncompositionality of the logic of indeterminacy, complex propositions
built out of those atomic sentences—such as
∨
i∈I φ(e, xi)—can still be true,
and therefore be members of the relevant ersatz world.
16In BW’s theory a sentence is valid just in case it is a member of all precisificational
possibilities for all worlds. Since BW’s ersatz worlds are classical maximally consistent sets
of sentences, every classical tautology is valid. On the other hand, indeterminate sentences
are neither true nor false. Thus, BW’s logic is neither bivalent nor compositional. An
important caveat : not all versions of BW’s account have those features. In particular,
the logic of indeterminacy developed in Barnes and Williams [7] is both bivalent and
compositional.
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The present, noncompositional account of quantum metaphysical inde-
terminacy is to be distinguished from the account of Wilson [27] [28] and
Bokulich [10]. According to Wilson, metaphysical indeterminacy obtains
just when there is some object possessing a determinable property P but
no unique determinate of P . So, there are two kinds of metaphysical inde-
terminacy: the gappy cases, when something has a determinable property
P but no determinate of P ; and the glutty cases, when something has a
determinable property P and multiple determinates of P . Wilson-Bokulich
regard quantum indeterminacy as an instance of gappy metaphysical inde-
terminacy, since a quantum particle can have the determinable property of
position (or momentum, etc.) but no determinate position value (or mo-
mentum value, etc.).
How does the Wilson-Bokulich construal of metaphysical quantum in-
determinacy stack up against mine? On either proposal, it can be true
that e has a position, even when e is in a superposition of position states.
Now, recall that the statement that e has a position is of the form ∃zφ(e, z),
which is logically equivalent to
∨
i∈I φ(e, xi), when xi∈I are all the position
values. Wilson-Bokulich claim that, in cases of superposition, ∃zφ(e, z) is
true whereas each φ(e, xi) is false, insofar as e determinately fails to have
any particular position (i.e., any determinate of the determinable position).
But since ∃zφ(e, z) is true, it cannot be the case that every φ(e, xi) is false
(by De Morgan’s Laws). So, the Wilson-Bokulich view appears to be in-
consistent, unless they can either (i) deny De Morgan’s Laws, or (ii) deny
the equivalence of ∃zφ(e, z) and
∨
i∈I φ(e, xi), or (iii) deny that e’s having a
position is regimented by a sentence of the form ∃zφ(e, z).
Since Wilson claims that her theory is compatible with classical logic,
(i) must be ruled out. The same can be said of (ii), insofar as denying the
equivalence of ∃zφ(e, z) and
∨
i∈I φ(e, xi) would be logically revisionary, al-
beit at the predicate, rather than propositional level.17 Regardless, I doubt
17Of course, ∃zφ(e, z) and
∨
i∈I φ(e, xi) are not logically equivalent if the class of position
values is contingent. But that issue is orthogonal to the problem being discussed. Thus,
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there is any well-motivated reason for taking on board either (i) or (ii). We
are left with option (iii), which is to deny that ‘e has a position’ is correctly
regimented by a sentence of the form ∃zφ(e, z). The problem with this third
route is that, according to the quantum mechanical formalism, ‘e has a posi-
tion’ displays precisely that quantifier structure. For in quantum mechanics
position is captured by a position operator, which induces a partial func-
tion φ from particles to position values. (The function is partial because,
in virtue of the eigenstate-eigenvalue link, only particles whose state is an
eigenstate of the position operator are assigned a position value.) Therefore,
for e to have a position is for it to have assigned some position value z under
the function φ, i.e. to be such that ∃zφ(e, z).
To conclude, Wilson-Bokulich have not provided a viable account of
quantum metaphysical indeterminacy. For, on pain of inconsistency, they
would have to embrace either an overly revisionary logic (options (i) and
(ii)) or an understanding of physical determinables which flouts the quantum
formalism (option (iii)).18
4 Conclusions
There was a time when the intelligibility of de re modality was cast into
doubt, mainly due to the absence of a precise framework that would capture
the peculiarity of its logic and semantics. With the advent of Kripke-style
to avoid pointless complications, I am setting the issue aside.
18I also have more general misgivings about Wilson’s theory of metaphysical indetermi-
nacy. First of all, it is unable to model metaphysically indeterminate existence (cf. Barnes
and Cameron [6]), because it would require existence and nonexistence to be determinates
of some determinable—an implausible view. Second, I think that none of the examples
of glutty metaphysical indeterminacy offered in Wilson [27] are adequately motivated (cf.
Bokulich [10]). Finally, Wilson regards open future claims as expressing instances of meta-
physical indeterminacy. Although I agree with her on that, I doubt that indeterminacy
about the open future can be given a determinable-based account (cf. Barnes and Cameron
[6]). A comprehensive assessment of Wilson’s theory of metaphysical indeterminacy goes
beyond the scope of this paper.
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model theory, some common misconceptions were cleared up and modal
predication became mainstream. Barnes and Williams, among others, have
tried to do the same with the notion of metaphysical indeterminacy: make it
respectable in the philosophical circles by spelling out its logical and seman-
tic structure. The resulting theory, however, is unable to model deep meta-
physical indeterminacy, due to the fact that quantum observables cannot be
all assigned precise values at the same time. I argued that the problem of
deep metaphysical indeterminacy can be defused by giving up the idea that
ersatz possible worlds must be complete. A further advantage of the present
proposal over BW is that it provides a reductive analysis of metaphysical
indeterminacy. Finally, I have argued that the logic of indeterminacy is
neither compositional nor bivalent. Which (nonclassical) logic is correct for
modeling languages with an indeterminate subject matter remains an open
question.
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